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INTRODUCTION 
Community rating restricts health insurers from varying premiums based on 
insurees’ risk profiles. It is a key feature of many health insurance markets. While 
designed to promote equity, this regulation incentivises insurers to focus on 
attracting low-risk (profitable) consumers while avoiding high-risk (unprofitable) 
consumers. This phenomenon is known as “risk selection”. Risk selection has a 
number of negative consequences, such as market segmentation and poor quality 
service to high-risk individuals (e.g. the old and sick). It also causes inefficiency 
where investment focusses on attracting low-risk individuals (e.g. the young and 
healthy) rather than improving price and quality. The best strategy for reducing 
risk selection incentives is good risk equalisation. Commonly, this involves 
providing risk-adjusted premium subsidies to insurers based on insurees’ risk 
profiles. These subsidies are generally administered through a risk equalisation 
scheme. 
Our study investigated the performance of Ireland’s scheme. Despite the 
liberalisation of the Irish health insurance market in the mid-1990s, bona-fide risk 
equalisation payments only commenced in 2013. The current risk equalisation 
system allocates risk-adjusted subsidies to insurers based on the age, sex, level of 
cover, and hospital utilisation, of insurees. 
 
 
                                                          
 
1 This Bulletin summaries the findings from: Keegan, C., Teljeur, C., Turner, B., and Thomas, S. “Addressing Market 
Segmentation and Incentives for Risk Selection: How Well Does Risk Equalisation in the Irish Private Health Insurance 
Market Work?”, The Economic and Social Review, Vol. 48, No. 1, Spring, 2017, pp. 61-84. Available online: 
http://www.esr.ie/article/view/676/154 
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DATA AND METHODS 
Data for this study were provided by Vhi Healthcare, the largest insurer in the 
market in terms of both market share and claims payout. The analysis used 
statistical models to give insight into how current and alternative risk equalisation 
specifications affect incentives for risk selection, by testing how well risk 
equalisation payments help match actual insurer claim expenditures on care. Of 
particular interest was whether, and to what extent, including information on 
diagnosis can improve the risk equalisation design. The main source of diagnostic 
information used in this analysis related to 35 high-cost diagnostic groups (e.g. 
renal failure, congestive heart failure). Basing payments on diagnostic 
information is a feature of more sophisticated risk equalisation designs, 
internationally. 
 
RESULTS 
Overall, the models suggest that the current risk equalisation design performs 
quite poorly. Moreover, replacing the current utilisation-based scheme with a 
high-cost diagnosis-based one improves performance substantially, reducing 
incentives for risk selection. A diagnosis-based scheme may also improve 
incentives for efficiency relative to a utilisation-based scheme.  
 
CONCLUSIONS 
Despite these potential benefits, policymakers need to be aware of a number of 
challenges regarding the introduction of diagnosis-based risk equalisation into 
the Irish health insurance market. For instance, newer entrants to the market 
may oppose such a move as the market risk distribution would most likely 
reinforce the transfer of risk-equalisation funds to Vhi Healthcare. A greater 
administrative burden would also be placed on both insurers and the regulator in 
relation to submitting and auditing diagnostic information. It is presently unclear 
whether all insurers have the ability to capture and code relevant diagnostic 
information.  
 
Whitaker Square, 
Sir John Rogerson’s Quay, 
Dublin 2
Telephone  +353 1 863 2000
Email admin@esri.ie
Web www.esri.ie
Twitter @ESRIDublin
